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THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION: A
CONTRADICTION IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
This Comment discusses the "automobile exception" to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement. After reviewing the his-
torical development of the exception, the author suggests that
warrantless searches of vehicles are inconsistent with fourth
amendment values. The author concludes that, in the absence of
a true exigency, warrantless searches of vehicles should be pro-
hibited. Instead, vehicles should be temporarily seized until a
search warrant is secured.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees to the people the right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures.' The United States Supreme Court, in in-
terpreting the amendment, normally requires that searches and
seizures be made pursuant to a warrant.2 The warrant require-
ment provides protection by requiring that the reasonableness of
the search be determined by a neutral magistrate rather than by
a law enforcement officer who is personally involved in the "com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."3 Warrantless searches
are deemed reasonable by the Court only in the case of a "few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions."4 The ex-
1. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
3. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Arkansas v. Sand-
ers, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), where the Court, in determining that luggage contained in
an automobile does not fall within the "automobile exception" stated that "the few
situations in which a search may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have
been carefully delineated and 'the burden is on those seeking the exemption to
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ceptions to the warrant requirement most often recognized are:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest;5 (2) moving vehicles;6 (3)
emergency circumstances;7 (4) hot pursuit;8 (5) stop and frisk;9
and (6) loss or destruction of evidence.' 0
All but one of these exceptions involve exigent circumstances
which make it impossible or impracticable to secure a search war-
show the need for it'." Id. at 760; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971). But see United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 9 (1977), where the Court determined whether the search was reasonable
under all the circumstances rather than whether it fell within a specific exception;
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), where the Court in upholding the
constitutionality of warrantless police inventory "searches" concluded "that in fol-
lowing standard police procedures, prevailing throughout the country and ap-
proved by the overwhelming majority of courts, the conduct of the police was not
'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 376; Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967), where the Court found "whether search and seizure is unreasona-
ble ... depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. at 59. But cf.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), where the Court mixed the "reasonable
under the circumstances" approach with the "unreasonable per se" approach. The
Court used the automobile exception and the plain view doctrine (discussed in
note 158 infra) to determine whether the search had been reasonable. Ultimately,
however, the Court grounded its decision on overall reasonableness, stating that
the search "was not unreasonable solely because a warrant had not been ob-
tained." Id. at 448. For a negative view of the Court's use of the "reasonable
under the circumstances" approach and support for the per se warrant require-
ment, see Note, United States v. Chadwick and the Lesser Intrusion Concept: The
Unreasonableness of Being Reasonable, 58 B.U.L. REV. 436 (1978).
5. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (authorizing a warrantless search
incident to lawful arrest of the person of the arrestee and the area within which
the arrestee could reach weapons and/or destructible evidence).
6. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
7. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrantless search incident to ur-
gent need to preserve life or avoid injury justified).
8. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (warrantless entry and search permissible when pursuing a felon).
9. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing stop and frisk on grounds less
substantial than probable cause but limited in intensity and scope to that neces-
sary to detect weapons).
10. The exception regarding loss or destruction of evidence has only been di-
rectly approved by the Supreme Court in situations where the evidence is being
destroyed by natural causes. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) the
taking of a blood sample without the defendant's consent was held not to violate
the fourth amendment because the blood-alcohol content was threatened with de-
struction. However, the Court has indicated that it would approve warrantless
searches where evidence is threatened with destruction by the defendant or a
third party. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (warrantless search possi-
bly justified where there was a realistic expectation that delay would result in de-
struction of evidence); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (warrantless search
not justified where goods seized were not in the process of destruction); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (imminent destruction of evidence may justify
warrantless search). For a discussion of this exception and its extensive applica-
tion in the lower courts, see Note, Warrantless Residential Searches to Prevent the
Destruction of Evidence: A Need for Strict Standards, 70 J. CRnmi. L.C. 255 (1979).
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rant." This is not necessarily true of the second exception, com-
monly known as the "automobile exception."12 This exception
allows a warrantless search of a vehicle stopped on a street or
highway if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle con-
tains evidence of a crime.13 Warrantless search of a home or
other constitutionally protected area is not allowed solely on the
basis of probable cause.14
The divergent treatment of automobiles was initially allowed
because of the exigency that a vehicle could be removed from the
jurisdiction before a search warrant could be secured.'5 However,
in practice, warrantless searches of vehicles are permitted where
the vehicle has been immobilized and is under police control.16 In
such situations there is no real exigency and it is no longer im-
practicable to secure a warrant.17 To justify the warrantless
search of an automobile under nonexigent circumstances, the
Supreme Court relies upon the diminished expectation of privacy
11. For a discussion of how warrantless searches are generally limited by the
exigency that gave rise to the exception see note 113 infra.
12. Although primarily applied to automobiles, the exception can reasonably
be applied to any vehicle capable of fleeing the jurisdiction before a warrant can
be secured. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (applied to a motorboat
engaged in running illegal liquor). Until recently the Supreme Court, while up-
holding searches of automobiles in circumstances where a search of a home or
other location might not be upheld, did not acknowledge the existence of an "auto-
mobile exception." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 382 (1976). However,
it now appears that the Court does recognize the existence of an "automobile ex-
ception" which both the majority and dissent refer to in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 760-68 (1979). It is not clear whether the exception refers to all valid war-
rantless automobile searches or is limited to those warrantless automobile
searches that fall within the more traditional definition of the automobile excep-
tion. See Moylan, The Automobile Exception" What It Is and What It Is Not-A
Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976) (discussing
cases within the traditional automobile exception and how they differ from other
automobile search cases that are analyzed and justified under other rationales
such as search incident to arrest, stop and frisk, the plain view doctrine, and in-
ventory searches).
13. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979).
14. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam), where the car was
stopped in the middle of the day on a main road but was not searched until after
being removed to the station house. No discussion of exigency was included. See
also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970), where the Court upheld a search
of a vehicle under non-exigent circumstances. The Court acknowledged the need
for exigency but under the facts of the case there was little or no possibility of the
car being moved.
17. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 462 (1971); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
that an individual enjoys in an automobile18 and the administra-
tive difficulties involved in the temporary seizure of a vehicle un-
til a warrant can be secured.19 These justifications for allowing an
exception to the warrant requirement are at best questionable. 20
The automobile exception should be discarded. Instead, in the
absence of either a true exigency 2' or consent, the warrantless
search of a vehicle should be prohibited and a policy favoring
temporary seizure of the vehicle until a search warrant is secured
should be instituted.22 Temporary seizure is consistent with the
Supreme Court's holding that the value being protected under the
fourth amendment is the privacy interest of the individual.23
Search, not seizure, intrudes on privacy interests.2 4 Until a
container has been opened and examined its contents are private
to the individual.
Proscribing warrantless searches of a vehicle in the absence of
true exigency or consent is also consistent with the Court's war-
rant requirement for personal luggage contained in an automo-
bile. Presently, upon probable cause, warrantless search is
permissible for the integral parts of an automobile but not for
18. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opin-
ion).
19. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n.14 (1979).
20. See text accompanying notes 124-40 infra.
21. As pointed out in the cases involving searches of luggage, exigencies com-
pletely unrelated to the item's inherent mobility may exist that could justify a
warrantless search of the luggage. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64
n.11 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1977) (exigency would be
present where there is reason to believe that the luggage contains some immedi-
ately dangerous instrumentality). This would also be true of vehicles. Also, when
law enforcement personnel are unable to control a vehicle, a true exigency would
exist. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 64 n.9 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (warrantless searches allowed where it was impracticable
to immobilize the vehicle). See text accompanying notes 137-39 infra.
22. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 63-64 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part). Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)
(prohibiting the "greater intrusion" of warrantless search of luggage where tempo-
rary seizure was sufficient to guard against loss of evidence). See also Williamson,
The Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent Circumstances, 31 OKLA.
L. REV. 110, 113, 144-45 (1978) (proposing that the exigency model be abandoned,
except in a very limited number of cases, in favor of defensive seizure and the se-
curing of a warrant for the subsequent search).
23. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 591 (1974) ("[I] nsofar as Fourth Amendment protection extends to a motor ve-
hicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.") (emphasis
added); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[Tihe Fourth Amendment
protects people-and not simply 'areas'. . . . The Government's activities ... vio-
lated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied.") (emphasis added); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1967).
24. See text accompanying notes 152-55 infra.
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pieces of luggage found therein.25 This disparate treatment re-
quires police officers to make subjective determinations whether
any particular item or area of a vehicle can be searched without a
warrant. Prohibiting warrantless searches in favor of temporary
seizure of the vehicle until a search warrant can be obtained
would provide a clear, consistent standard for law enforcement
personnel. More importantly, it would assure that an individual
would not be subjected to "unfettered governmental intrusion
every time he entered an automobile." 26
This Comment will review the development of the automobile
exception.27 It will examine the justifications for the exception
and the extensive problems involved in its application. Finally,
the Comment will discuss the proposed replacement policy of
prohibiting warrantless searches of the vehicle in favor of tempo-
rary seizure until a warrant can be secured.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
During Prohibition28 America's drinkers turned to bootleggers
for a supply of illegal liquor. The highways and seaways became
the arteries of supply, with the bootleggers' fast-moving vehicles
the means of delivery. In response, the federal and state govern-
ments fielded an army of prohibition agents to stem the flow. 29
The National Prohibition Act provided for the seizure of any vehi-
cle transporting liquor in violation of the law as well as the
seizure of the illegal liquor itself.30 The constitutionality of a war-
rantless search and seizure of a vehicle transporting illegal liquor
25. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1979), in which the Court re-
fused to uphold a warrantless search of luggage contained in the trunk of an auto-
mobile under the automobile exception. The Court distinguished permitting
warrantless searches of the integral parts of the vehicle on the basis of a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in an automobile and administrative difficulties.
26. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
27. For a discussion of the automobile exception and case development, see
Moylan, supra note 12; Williamson, supra note 22; Yackle, The Burger Court and
the Fourth Amendment, 26 KANSAS L. REV. 337, 404-15 (1978); Note, Warrantless
Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L, REV. 835 (1974); Note, Misstat-
ing the Exigency Rule: The Supreme Court v. The Exigency Requirement in War-
rantless Automobile Searches, 28 SYRAcusE L. REV. 981 (1977).
28. Prohibition went into effect on January 16, 1919 and was repealed on De-
cember 5, 1933.
29. See, e.g., Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559 (1927); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
30. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 315 (1919) (repealed in 1933
by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI).
on the open road was soon tested in Carroll v. United States.3 1
In upholding the convictions of two bootleggers under the Na-
tional Prohibition Act, a majority of the Court in Carroll con-
cluded that Congress intended to provide for the warrantless
search of an automobile for contraband if the search was made on
the basis of probable cause and without malice. 32 The Court fur-
ther found that the requirement of a warrant for the search of a
dwelling but not for the search of an automobile was consistent
with the fourth amendment because the amendment prohibits
only those searches that are unreasonable.3 3 Since a vehicle can
be quickly moved from a jurisdiction before a warrant is obtained,
it is not unreasonable to permit warrantless searches of vehicles
while requiring warrants for the search of permanent structures.3 4
However, the Court emphasized the fact that, although warrant-
less searches of moving vehicles for contraband are not prohib-
ited by the fourth amendment, not every car may be subjected to
search. The rights of people traveling the highways must be bal-
anced against the need for effective law enforcement.35 People
have the right to use the public highways free of interruption.3 6
An officer should only be allowed to interrupt this free passage if
there is probable cause to believe that a vehicle is carrying con-
traband or illegal merchandise.37 Without probable cause the
search would be illegal and the evidence inadmissible at trial.38
In the years immediately following Carroll the automobile ex-
31. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
32. Id. at 147.
33. Id. The Court, in determining what constituted an unreasonable warrant-
less search, reviewed extensive federal legislation authorizing warrantless
searches for and seizure of goods subject to forfeiture. This legislation included
the fledgling nation's first statute regulating the collection of duties. This statute,
passed by the same Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights, provided for the
warrantless search of ships or vessels which were believed to conceal goods sub-
ject to duty and authorized the warrantless seizure of such goods. Yet the statute
required the issuance of a warrant to enter a dwelling or permanent structure to
search for similar goods concealed therein. Different treatment of mobile vehicles
and permanent structures was not considered violative of the fourth amendment
by the very Congress that created it. Id. at 150-51.
34. Id. at 153. It should be noted that at no time did the Carroll opinion inti-
mate that motor vehicles were being singled out for special treatment under the
fourth amendment for any reason other than mobility. In fact, in discussing what
would constitute an illegal seizure by authorities, the Court after dealing with the
requirement of probable cause said: "In cases where the securing of a warrant is
reasonably practicable, it must be used." Id. at 156.
35. Id. at 153-54.
36. Id. at 154. Here the Court implied that the primary interest being pro-
tected is freedom of movement. This is contrary to later cases emphasizing pri-
vacy as the interest to be protected.
37. Id. at 156.
38. Id.
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ception was used in relatively few cases. 39 Those cases added lit-
tle to the doctrine established in Carroll.40 However, in 1970, with
Chambers v. Maroney4l the automobile exception entered a new
era. The principal question before the Court was whether evi-
dence seized from an automobile in which the petitioner had
been riding at the time of his arrest could be used against him.42
The major difference between Chambers and earlier cases was
that in Chambers the automobile was searched after it was taken
to the police station rather than at the scene of the arrest.43
In upholding the validity of the search and the admissibility of
the evidence obtained therefrom, Mr. Justice White, writing for
the seven man majority, reiterated that probable cause is the min-
imum requirement for any search to be valid and that generally
the judgment of a magistrate is also required. Only in exigent cir-
cumstances can the independent judgment of the magistrate be
dispensed with.44 It is clear that probable cause for the search
and seizure existed both at the time the automobile was stopped
and at the station house when the search was made.45 It is also
39. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559 (1927). For a view that the limited use of the exception was occa-
sioned by the Court's greater use of the search incident to arrest exception in
cases where the opportunity to use both exceptions coincided, see Moylan, supra
note 12 at 987, 1000-01. Judge Moyland, of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,
points out that only with the circumscription of the search incident to arrest pe-
rimeters in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), was it necessary for the Court
to rely more heavily on the motor vehicles exception.
40. One notable exception was Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938),
where the Court without comment applied the Carroll doctrine absent a specific
legislative provision for warrantless search or seizure. The Court also extended
the doctrine to apply where a vehicle had already been driven into the defendant's
garage and stopped. Id. at 253. The Court reasoned that since the car could have
been stopped and searched just before it entered the garage, its passage therein,
closely followed by the officer, did not change the officer's right to search. Thus, it
appeared from Scher that both vehicles on the open road and, under some circum-
stances, stationary but inherently mobile vehicles fall within the exception.
41. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
42. Under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), petitioner probably would not
be allowed to contest the validity of the search. The Court there determined that
a passenger did not have a sufficient expectation of privacy in a vehicle to have his
fourth amendment rights violated by its search. Id. at 148.
43. 399 U.S. at 43-45.
44. Id. at 51.
45. Probable cause to stop and search the vehicle was found because wit-
nesses at the scene of a robbery had seen a similar car with four men in it speed
away. Id. at 46, 48-49. It is evident that the facts giving rise to probable cause
would not change on the trip to the station house.
clear that, under Carroll, exigency in the mobility of the automo-
bile existed at the time the car was stopped. However, the Court
went on to find that the exigency still obtained at the station
house46 because "the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car
is readily movable." 47 Since at the time of the search the car was
under police control at the police station with all the suspects in
custody,48 it is difficult to imagine how these circumstances were
exigent.
Although the Court grounded the decision on "exigent circum-
stances," the lack of exigency under the facts of the case indicates
that the Court was really swayed by other considerations. This
has been confirmed by subsequent decisions acknowledging that
there was no real danger of the car being removed.49 The Court
has justified the Chambers warrantless search in retrospect, not
on the basis of exigency, but on the basis of a diminished expec-
tation of privacy in an automobile5 O and on the basis of the ad-
ministrative burden that would be imposed by requiring seizure
of the vehicle until a search warrant can be obtained.51 Thus, in
an opinion in which the Court initially stated that the judgment of
the magistrate as to probable cause could only be dispensed with
under exigent circumstances, the Court held that evidence ob-
tained from a warrantless search under nonexigent circumstances
should not be excluded.
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Chambers, stressed that the
existence of probable cause alone is not sufficient to justify war-
rantless searches. There must be some exigency that requires an
exception to the warrant requirement and that exception should
"be no broader than necessitated by the circumstances
46. Id at 52.
47. Id. at 51. The only indication why the Court viewed an automobile in po-
lice custody at the police station as being "readily movable" came when the opin-
ion stated that the mobility of the automobile still obtains "unless the Fourth
Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to
anyone until a warrant is secured." Id. at 53. That the Court found that mobility
still obtained could imply that the Court did not see the fourth amendment as per-
mitting warrantless seizure with a denial of access until a search warrant is se-
cured. However, it does not appear from the rest of the opinion that the Court
believed this to be the case. In three places the opinion referred to "immediate"
searches without warrants and temporary seizure of the vehicle until a warrant
could be secured as constitutionally permissible alternatives. Id. at 51-52. If the
Court believed that the police could not deny access to the vehicle under the
fourth amendment, it could not have considered the temporary seizure of the vehi-
cle constitutionally permissible.
48. Id. at 44.
49. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
50. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,12-13 (1977).
51. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64 n.11 (1979).
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presented."5 2 The dissent criticized the majority's position as be-
ing inconsistent with the Court's requirement that warrantless in-
trusions be limited by the exigencies presented.53
According to the dissent, temporary seizure of an automobile
until a search warrant can be obtained and warrantless search of
a vehicle create different degrees of intrusion into fourth amend-
ment values.54 In a situation such as that in Chambers, the
"lesser" intrusion is a temporary seizure of the vehicle until the
search warrant can be secured since the suspects are already in
custody and the temporary immobilization of the vehicle creates
very little inconvenience. Even when no arrest is made the tem-
porary immobilization of the vehicle is preferable because a war-
rantless search violates the individual's interest in privacy
protected by the fourth amendment. 5 Moreover, when a vehicle
is temporarily seized rather than searched without a warrant, an
individual has an opportunity to consent to the search of his prop-
erty, thereby making his own determination of what is the lesser
intrusion.56 Absent such consent, however, allowing the "greater"
intrusion of warrantless search of the automobile where a
"lesser" intrusion is available is inconsistent with the Court's
preference for the warrant requirement.5 7
In the term following the Chambers decision, the Court in Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire,5 8 once again was presented with the
question whether evidence seized in a "warrantless" 59 automobile
search made after the vehicle was in police custody was admissi-
ble in court. Mr. Justice Stewart, in a plurality opinion, explained
the Chambers holding and distinguished Coolidge from Cham-
bers. As explained by Justice Stewart, Chambers held "only that
where the police may stop and search an automobile under Car-
roll, they may also seize it and search it later at the police sta-
52. 399 U.S. at 61 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 62-63 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 63-64 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 64 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
57. Id.
58. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
59. The searches were made pursuant to a warrant that was subsequently
found invalid because it was not issued by a neutral magistrate. Id. at 448-53.
When the Court determined that the warrant was invalid, the state attempted to
justify the searches under the automobile exception, as searches incident to ar-
rest, and under the plain view doctrine.
tion."60 Since the plurality did not find exigent circumstances 61
that would have justified a warrantless search under Carroll
when the vehicle was initially stopped, the subsequent search at
the police station could not be justified under Chambers.62
Coolidge is the only case in which the Supreme Court invali-
dated a warrantless automobile search on lack of exigency. In
Coolidge the Court refused to allow a warrantless search unless
there was an actual possibility that the vehicle could be moved.
Although the Court acknowledged the inherent mobility of the
automobile, it attached no constitutional significance to that mo-
bility.63 In previous cases the Court did not always acknowledge
this distinction and instead apparently relied on the inherent mo-
bility of the vehicle to justify warrantless searches where there
was no real possibility of removal.64
In Cardwell v. Lewis,65 also a plurality opinion, a new rationale
for justifying warrantless searches of motor vehicles was ad-
vanced. In Cardwell, the plurality held that a warrantless seizure
of an automobile at a public parking lot and the subsequent war-
rantless examination 66 of its exterior at a police impoundment
area did not violate the petitioner's fourth amendment rights. 67
60. Id. at 463.
61. Id. at 460.
62. Id. at 463.
63. Id. at 461 n.18. Where there was no one available to remove the vehicle
and to do so would have required slipping by a police guard, the Court refused to
attach constitutional significance to the vehicle's literal mobility. See also Wil-
liamson, supra note 22, at 111-13 for a discussion of whether exigencies must be
real (existing under the facts of the case) or hypothetical (existing within a gen-
eral group of cases but not under the present facts) and a determination that a
majority of current Supreme Court Justices do not require real exigency.
64. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Wil-
liamson, supra note 22, at 111-13; Note, Misstating the Exigency Rule: The Supreme
Court v. The Exigency Requirement in Warrantless Automobile Searches, supra
note 27, at 992-93.
65. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
66. The examination of Cardwell's car consisted of making tire casts and tak-
ing paint scrapings from a fender. Id. at 586.
67. Id. at 585. The plurality opinion appears to hold that since the fourth
amendment primarily protects privacy rights it would not be applicable to an ex-
amination of the exterior of an automobile because no reasonable expectation of
privacy was infringed. Id. at 589, 591.
Having concluded that the "search" of the automobile was not in itself a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment, Justice Blackmun endeavored to determine
whether the prior warrantless seizure of the automobile would affect the search's
validity. Id. at 592. The plurality found that the warrantless seizure of the auto-
mobile should not affect the validity of the search. Since the police could have val-
idly "searched" the car before it was seized, its prior impoundment should not act
as a constitutional barrier to the use of the evidence. Id. at 593. To bolster this
argument the opinion goes on to state that the seizure itself was valid under the
automobile exception on the basis of probable cause and a rather strained argu-
[VOL. 17: 933, 19801 Comments
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This holding was based in part upon the finding that:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as
the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants
and its contents are in plain view.68
However, the rationale that the warrantless search was justified
because of the "lesser" expectation of privacy in the vehicle com-
manded no more support than did Mr. Justice Stewart's four man
dissenting opinion.69 The dissent emphasized that automobiles
have been treated differently for fourth amendment purposes
only because of their mobility and that the Carroll doctrine is
only applicable where it is not practicable to obtain a warrant be-
cause of the vehicle's mobility.70 Not finding exigency under the
facts in Cardwell, the dissenting Justices would have held the au-
tomobile exception inapplicable. 7 '
Cardwell is the most recent case in which the Court addresses
the question whether warrantless search and seizure of an au-
tomobile can be upheld under the automobile exception. As the
exception has developed from Carroll to Cardwell the require-
ment of probable cause has remained constant. However, the use
of the exception is no longer limited to situations in which legisla-
tive authority exists for the warrantless search and seizure7 2 or to
searches for contraband.73 Nor is the use of the exception limited
to searches made under present exigency. Instead the Court has
ment that exigency existed because petitioner's wife might have taken the car. Id.
at 593-96.
68. Id. at 590. Under previous decisions, an individual was entitled to the
same fourth amendment protection for an automobile as for other effects, but, be-
cause of necessity caused by mobility, warrantless intrusions were allowed. How-
ever, under Cardwell the right to fourth amendment protection is dependent on
the individual having a privacy interest. Id. at 591. Since the Court determined
that an individual has a "lesser expectation of privacy" in an automobile, there
may be a question whether an individual has any right to fourth amendment pro-
tection in an automobile; and, if so, to what extent there is a right. The Cardwell
opinion states that it does not mean that every part of the interior of the vehicle is
without fourth amendment protection. Id. at 591. However, the opinion does not
tell us what parts of the vehicle are protected or to what extent.
69. Both the plurality and dissenting opinions had support from four Justices.
Mr. Justice Powell concurred only on technical grounds. Id. at 597.
70. Id. at 597-98.
71. Id. at 598-99.
72. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (Court without comment ap-
plied exception where legislation did not authorize warrantless search and
seizure).
73. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 62 n.7 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
allowed warrantless searches of vehicles in police custody based
on the exigency at the time of the original seizure of the vehicle. 74
The cases agree that a vehicle's mobility on occasion necessi-
tates warrantless searches or seizures. Cardwell and Coolidge,
however, may be at variance on whether or not warrantless
searches of an automobile are justified because an individual en-
joys a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile. Card-
well clearly supports warrantless automobile searches on this
basis,7 5 while Coolidge may be read to imply that warrantless
searches are not justifiable solely on this basis.76 It is difficult to
tell how much influence either decision will have on subsequent
holdings of the Court because neither opinion enjoyed the sup-
port of a majority of the Justices. This is especially true since
Cardwell dealt with the examination of the exterior of a vehicle
and any discussion regarding a diminished expectation of privacy
in the interior of the vehicle was dictum.77
The transition from Carroll to Cardwell indicates that the right
which the Court is protecting in automobile search cases has
changed. In the early cases the Court held that the fourth amend-
ment protected the right of an individual to travel free from un-
reasonable interference.78 More recently the Court has
determined that the value to be protected is an individual's pri-
vacy interest in his vehicle and its contents.7 9 This shift in em-
phasis was important in the two most recent Supreme Court
cases involving the automobile exception. These cases, United
States v. Chadwick,80 and Arkansas v. Sanders,81 do not deal with
the search and seizure of an automobile but the search of per-
sonal luggage.
part, dissenting in part) (first time doctrine extended to authorize general search
of vehicle for evidence of crime).
74. Although the Chambers decision itself does not state that a subsequent
warrantless search may be made without exigency, later cases explaining Cham.
bers make it clear that this is the case. See text accompanying notes 49-51 & 60-62
supra.
75. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974).
76. Coolidge's emphasis on mobility as the underlying basis for the automo-
bile exception coupled with its analysis of both prior and contemporaneous exi-
gency by inference may be seen as being contrary to Cardwell's position that the
automobile, because of its lesser expectation of privacy, is inherently inferior for
fourth amendment purposes. 443 U.S. at 459-60.
77. In Cardwell the diminished expectation rationale did not play a part in the
Court's determination that the warrantless seizure of the car was valid. The Court
concentrated on whether probable cause and exigent circumstances were present.
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593-96 (1974).
78. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176-77 (1949); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
79. See generally cases cited note 23 supra.
80. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
81. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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In a number of lower court decisions the automobile exception
was extended by analogy to the search and seizure of movable
pieces of luggage.82 The constitutionality of this practice was ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in 1977 in United States v. Chad-
wick. Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a locked
footlocker that had been placed in the trunk of a stationary car.
The car engine had not been started nor had the trunk of the car
been closed when the federal narcotics agents arrested the de-
fendants and seized the footlocker. The footlocker was removed
to the federal building where it was searched ninety minutes later
without a warrant or consent.83
Because the defendants did not contest the validity of the ini-
tial seizure of the footlocker, the Supreme Court's analysis was
limited to the validity of the subsequent warrantless search at the
federal building. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the seven-man
majority, first rejected the government's contention that the
fourth amendment's warrant clause protected only privacy inter-
ests identified with the home, office and private communica-
tions. 84 The Court then examined the government's argument
that the automobile exception rationale should be extended to
luggage because luggage is capable of being moved.85 After ac-
knowledging the traditional mobility justification for the automo-
bile exception, the majority explained that automobile searches
are allowed when there is no actual mobility because of an indi-
vidual's lesser expectation of privacy in the vehicle.86 The Court
distinguished searches of luggage from searches of automobiles
on the basis that those factors that tend to diminish an individ-
ual's expectation of privacy in his motor vehicle 87 do not exist for
an individual's luggage. On the contrary, an individual's expecta-
82. United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1973); People v. McKinnon, 7
Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
83. 433 U.S. at 3-5.
84. The Court criticized and rejected the government's contention on the ba-
ses of a historical analysis of the fourth amendment and a review of prior
Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 6-11. For a view that the government's core pri-
vacy argument may have had some merit insofar as it was based on previous
Supreme Court decisions, see Note, United States v. Chadwick and the Lesser In-
trusion Concept: The Unreasonableness of Being Reasonable, supra note 4, at 447-
49.
85. The government did not contend, as it had in the lower courts, that the
footlocker's brief contact with the automobile made it subject to the automobile
exception directly. 433 U.S. at 5-6, 11.
86. Id. at 12.
87. Factors which the Court found tended to diminish an expectation of pri-
tion of privacy in luggage is great because it is used as a reposi-
tory for personal effects.8 8
In addition, the majority found that the footlocker's inherent
mobility alone would not permit the abandonment of the warrant
clause. The seizure of the footlocker, plus the availability of ade-
quate storage facilities for the footlocker, was sufficient to protect
the evidence until a warrant could be secured.89 The majority
opinion acknowledged that, at least for searches of personal lug-
gage, the "greater intrusion" is a warrantless search rather than a
temporary seizure while obtaining a search warrant.90
The Court in Chadwick did not determine whether luggage in
an automobile stopped on the open road was subject to warrant-
less search under the automobile exception.91 Subsequent to
Chadwick there were conflicting lower court decisions on
whether such a search is constitutional.92 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question in Arkansas v. Sanders93 in which the police
stopped a taxi on a city street ahd, without a warrant or consent,
immediately searched the suitcase of one of the passengers. The
defendant conceded the validity of the seizure of the suitcase and
the only question before the Court was the constitutionality of
the search.94 The five-man majority opinion by Mr. Justice Powell
questioned whether the validity of the search of the suitcase
should be governed by Chadwick or by Carroll and Chambers. In
determining whether the search could be justified under the auto-
mobile exception, the Court considered both the mobility of the
vehicle and the diminished expectation of privacy in an automo-
bile as the underlying justifications for the exception. 95 The
Court, noting that this was the first time that the question of a
search of luggage found in an automobile as opposed to search of
an "integral part" of the vehicle was before the Court, declined to
extend the exception to warrantless searches of luggage. 96 The
vacy were the transportation function, vehicle registration, and traffic regulation.
Id. at 12-13.
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See note 85 supra.
92. Compare United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) (search of two
unlocked brief cases at police station upheld under Chambers), and United States
v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977) (search of closed suitcase at scene of ar-
rest distinguished from Chadwick), with United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175
(8th Cir. 1978) (search of closed suitcase at scene found unconstitutional in ac-
cordance with Chadwick), and United States v. Vallieres, 443 F. Supp. 186 (D.
Conn. 1977) (subsequent search of two suitcases at federal building unconstitu-
tional).
93. 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979).
94. Id. at 761-62.
95. Id. at 761.
96. Id. at 763-65.
946
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Court reasoned that once the officer had seized the piece of lug-
gage and had it within his control it was no longer mobile.9 7 An
individual does not necessarily have any lesser expectation of pri-
vacy in luggage located in an automobile than in luggage located
elsewhere. 98
The Court also distinguished warrantless searches of the auto-
mobile itself from warrantless searches of luggage contained
therein based on the greater burden imposed on law enforcement
agencies impounding a vehicle. The seizure and storage of lug-
gage is far less burdensome than the seizure and storage of an au-
tomobile.99 The majority opinion concluded that in order for the
police to search personal luggage there must exist some exigent
circumstances other than the mere location of the luggage in an
automobile on the highway.100
Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion joined by Mr. Jus-
tice Stevens, found the search unconstitutional but would not
have called the automobile exception into question because the
search was limited to the suitcase and did not involve a general
search of the vehicle.' 0 ' Chief Justice Burger felt that the ques-
tion of the validity of a luggage search incidental to a general
search of a vehicle should be left for the proper case. 0 2 However,
it would appear from the general language of the majority opinion
that the majority Justices intended their holding to apply to a
general search of an automobile as well as to a search directed at
a specific piece of luggage.103
It is clear that this was the interpretation placed on the major-
ity opinion by the dissenting Justices. 0 4 Mr. Justice Blackmun,
joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, argued that the search should
have been upheld under the automobile exception. They criti-
cized the majority for carving out an exception to an exception,
arguing that this would create extensive problems for law en-
forcement personnel. The police officer would be required to dis-
tinguish between "luggage" and "integral parts of the automobile"
and between "personal luggage" and "containers and pack-
97. Id. at 763-64.
98. Id. at 764-65.
99. Id. at 765 n.14.
100. Id. at 766.
101. Id. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
102. Id. at 768 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
103. Id. at 763.
104. Id. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
ages." 05 The dissent proposed the adoption of a clear-cut rule al-
lowing police officers to seize and search any personal property
found in an automobile whenever the automobile would be sub-
ject to a warrantless search under Carroll and Chambers.lo6
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
With Sanders the Court has created a double standard. A vehi-
cle may be validly searched without a warrant under Carroll and
Chambers. But, absent a true exigency, luggage and probably
other personal effects contained therein cannot be searched with-
out a warrant. Under the fourth amendment an individual is pro-
tected from unreasonable searches and seizures of all "effects." 0 7
Yet the Court is allowing disparate treatment of the automobile
and at least some effects found within it.
The Court has justified warrantless searches of automobiles on
three bases. The traditional rationale is that because of a vehi-
cle's mobility it can be readily removed from the jurisdiction
before a warrant can be secured.108 More recently the Court has
relied upon the diminished expectation of privacy that an individ-
ual enjoys in an automobile'0 9 and the administrative burden in-
volved in temporarily seizing a vehicle." 0
Mobility
There are two anomalies present in the application of the auto-
mobile exception based on the exigency of mobility. First, both
luggage and automobiles are readily movable. However, the
Supreme Court refuses to allow mobility alone to justify warrant-
less searches of luggage' and at the same time allows mobility
to justify warrantless searches of vehicles." 2 Second, the
Supreme Court in most instances limits warrantless searches by
the exigency giving rise to the exception." 3 This has not been the
case with the automobile exception." 4
105. Id. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. See note I supra.
108. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
109. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); Carroll v. United States, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
110. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n.14 (1979).
111. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
112. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
113. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (limiting searches inci-
dent to arrest to area in which individual could gain control of a weapon or de-
structible evidence); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (limiting "stop and frisk"
search to the extent necessary to detect weapons).
114. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra. See generally cases cited
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In the search and seizure of an automobile on the open road
several distinct acts take place. First the vehicle is stopped by the
police. Then it is temporarily seized for purposes of the search,115
searched, and if necessary, permanently seized. In Carroll and
other early cases, the Court did not look at the individual steps of
the process but considered the search and seizure as one com-
plete act.116 The initial mobility of the vehicle thereby justified
the whole process. This was a reasonable approach in the early
cases as the searches and seizures were essentially simultaneous
and could be viewed as one continuous act.
However, Chambers and subsequent cases involved searches
and seizures which were not conducted simultaneously. Instead,
the police seized the vehicle, removed it to the station house, and
searched it some time later."17 Under these circumstances, war-
rantless searches and seizures are separate but related acts and
the Supreme Court makes a separate determination of the valid-
ity of each act.118 If separate determinations of constitutionality
are made for search and seizure, exigent circumstances can be
examined at each point in time to determine if the warrantless in-
trusion is justified under an exception to the warrant require-
ment. Although the Court follows this analysis to determine the
validity of searches of luggage found within the automobile,1 9 it
note 16 supra. For discussions of how the Court has allowed warrantless searches
of automobiles without real exigency, see Williamson, supra note 22, at 111-13;
Note, Misstating the Exigency Rule: The Supreme Court v. The Exigency Require-
ment in Warrantless Automobile Searches, supra note 27, at 990-98 (1977).
115. If consent were given, temporary seizure would not be necessary. Absent
consent, however, temporary seizure is necessary to effectuate the search of the
item.
116. The Court in the earlier cases talked about the justification for the search
alone. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). This would be consistent with considering the process as
one continuous act. If the Court does not analyze the situation as a series of acts,
but as a search followed by seizure if contraband is found, then only the search
would have to be justified. The discovery of the contraband would necessitate the
seizure.
117. See generally cases cited note 16 supra. See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 587-88 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1971).
118. Often the validity of either the search or the seizure will, at least in part,
be dependent upon the validity or non-validity of the other. In Coolidge, a subse-
quent search was found invalid because the prior seizure was invalid. In Cham-
bers, a subsequent search was justified in part on the validity of the prior seizure.
However, as may be inferred from Chadwick and Sanders, it is possible to have a
valid warrantless seizure and still not have a valid subsequent search.
119. In both Chadwick and Sanders the Court refused to validate a search
under nonexigent circumstances but stated that where true exigency exists a war-
does not apply it to the search of the automobile itself. Instead,
the Court has allowed a search some time after the initial seizure
of the vehicle under nonexigent circumstances, if an exigency ex-
isted at the time the vehicle was seized.120 A subsequent search,
however, cannot then be realistically justified on the basis of exi-
gency since the vehicle is in police custody and can no longer be
removed from the jurisdiction.
Once search and seizure are analyzed separately in noncon-
temporaneous situations, such as Chambers, it rationally follows
that they may be analyzed separately for contemporaneous
search and seizure on the open road as well. A functioning vehi-
cle on the open road is obviously mobile and capable of being re-
moved from the jurisdiction. This exigency coupled with probable
cause should justify the initial warrantless intrusion of tempora-
rily stopping and seizing the vehicle. However, once the vehicle is
stopped, further warrantless intrusion may not be justified. Exi-
gency exists only if the vehicle can still be removed from the dis-
trict. This depends upon who has control of the vehicle.
In the situation in which an officer has sufficient temporary con-
trol over a vehicle to search it, but not to hold it until a search
warrant can be obtained121 exigency still exists, not because the
object to be searched is an automobile but because the police of-
ficer is incapable of exercising control over the object until a war-
rant can be secured. An immediate warrantless search in such
situations should be justified. However, in a situation in which
the police officer can exercise effective control over the vehicle,122
exigency no longer exists and a warrantless search should not be
allowed. To allow a warrantless search when the police exercise
effective control over a vehicle violates the Court's policy that ex-
ceptions be limited by the exigency.123
rantless search may be permitted. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64 n.11
(1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1977). The Court further
stressed that the exigency of mobility must be determined at the point immedi-
ately before the search. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763; United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
120. See generally cases cited note 16 supra. See also' Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 458-63 (1971) (subsequent search invalid where exigency did
not exist at time vehicle was seized).
121. Such a situation might exist where a vehicle could not be adequately pro-
tected and any delay would provide the suspect or accomplices with an opportu-
nity to remove the vehicle or evidence.
122. In none of the cases from Carroll to Cardwell, with the possible exception
of Chambers, where conditions interfering with a contemporaneous search were
mentioned, is there any indication that the police officer's control of the vehicle
was threatened.
123. See note 113 supra.
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Diminished Expectation of Privacy
The second rationale given for justifying warrantless searches
of automobiles is that an individual enjoys a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile. The primary value to be pro-
tected under the fourth amendment is privacy.124 In determining
whether a privacy interest should be protected against warrant-
less searches the Court looks to see whether an individual has a
justified privacy expectation in that article.125 If an individual has
a diminished expectation of privacy, a warrantless search may be
more readily justified.
In no case has a majority of Supreme Court Justices relied
upon the diminished expectation of privacy rationale to uphold a
warrantless search in an automobile exception case.12 6 However,
the Court has relied on a diminished expectation of privacy in up-
holding warrantless searches of automobiles in other contexts,
such as inventory searches and border searches. 2 7 Whether an
individual has a diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle is
arguable. The automobile is pervasive within our society.12 8 It is
used not only for transportation but for work, recreation and so-
cializing. It is used to carry important papers between one's place
124. See generally cases cited note 23 supra.
125. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (two-
fold test developed to determine whether an individual's privacy interest was cov-
ered by the fourth amendment). An individual must have a subjective expectation
of privacy. That expectation of privacy must also be one society would recognize
as reasonable. Id. at 361.
126. In Cardwell the four-man plurality relied in part on the "lesser" expecta-
tion of privacy rationale to uphold a warrantless search of the exterior of an auto-
mobile. Also, in Chadwick and Sanders the Court distinguished searches of
luggage from searches of the automobile itself on this basis. It must be
remembered, however, that as far as the expectation of privacy in automobiles is
concerned, the statements are dicta, as they were not essential to the holding that
the warrantless search of the luggage was invalid.
127. Cases which upheld warrantless searches of automobiles by relying at
least in part on the lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle are: United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of
"checkpoint" stop at some distance from border); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 367-69 (1976) (police inventory search); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973) (evidence discovered inadvertently while police officer searching for a gun
reasonably believed to be a danger to the public found admissible primarily on
grounds of plain view doctrine).
128. In 1978, the U.S. Department of Transportation projected that by 1980 there
would be approximately 155 million registered motor vehicles in the United States.
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, SELECTED HIGHWAY STATISTICS AND CHARTS (1978).
of business and home. 2 9 Many people use it to seek a moment of
solitude, a time to be alone with their thoughts.130 It is not rea-
sonable to assume that an individual loses an expectation of pri-
vacy at these times simply because he is in an automobile.
Because someone uses their automobile for transportation and
is subject to safety and traffic regulations,131 it does not necessar-
ily follow that he has any lesser expectation of privacy in other
aspects of his automobile. A person's general expectation of pri-
vacy in his home is not lessened because he is subject to building
codes and zoning regulations. He is subjected to these intrusions
only to the extent that it is necessary to carry out the purpose of
the codes and regulations. So it should be with the automobile.
There are indications that the Supreme Court is aware that in-
dividuals do maintain a justified privacy expectation in their mo-
tor vehicles and that under some circumstances warrantless
searches even of "integral parts" of the vehicle should not be al-
lowed. In Cardwell the Court pointed out that the diminished ex-
pectation of privacy did not mean that every part of the interior of
the vehicle would be denied fourth amendment protection.132
Also, the Court's treatment of personal luggage in automobiles
may call into question whether a warrantless search in a high pri-
vacy area such as a glove compartment is valid.133 Since a per-
son's expectation of privacy in a glove compartment, particularly
if it is locked, may be very great, the same rationale that was used
129. See United States v. Edwards, 554 F.2d 1331, 1338 (5th Cir. 1977) (judges'
draft opinions carried in automobiles).
130. The individual seeking solitude in a drive might be compared to the night
stroller in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1972).
131. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (one has lesser expectation
of privacy because car's function is transportation and it travels the highway in
plain view); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (states require vehicle
registration and licensing of operators, as well as regulate the condition and man-
ner of operation, thereby diminishing expectation of privacy).
132. 417 U.S. at 591.
133. In a recent California court of appeal decision the court found that an im-
mediate warrantless search of the trunk of a vehicle parked on a city street was
invalid. The court based its decision on the fact that the trunk is a part of the car
in which an individual has a particularly high privacy interest. Absent genuine
"urgency" the car must be impounded until a search warrant can be obtained.
The court felt that Chadwick and Sanders had cast considerable doubt on the
Chambers' principle that there is no constitutional difference between immediate
warrantless search and impoundment. People v. Rodriguez, 102 Cal. App. 3d 510;
162 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1980), hearing granted, (June 19, 1980). Under California law
the supreme court may order a cause transferred to itself for hearing and decision
within a maximum of 90 days after a decision by a court of appeal. By granting
the hearing the court of appeal decision is automatically vacated and is of no force
or effect either as a statement of law or as a judgment. CAi- RtLEs OF COURT
§§ 28(a), 976(d) (West 1980); 5 CAL. JuR. Appellate Review § 434 (3d ed. 1973).
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in Chadwick and Sanders may be used to invalidate a warrant-
less search of at least that part of the vehicle.
Perhaps the Court's strongest recent statement regarding pri-
vacy expectations in an automobile was in Delaware v. Prouse.1 34
Prouse involved a random stop to check a driver's license and car
registration. Upholding a motion to suppress evidence on the
ground that random stops of a vehicle are unconstitutional unless
there is a reasonable suspicion that the operator is unlicensed,
Mr. Justice White stated:
An individual operating or travelling in an automobile does not lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its
use are subject to government regulation .... Undoubtedly, many [peo-
ple] find a greater sense of security and privacy in travelling in an auto-
mobile than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes
of travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intru-
sion every time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.135
Administrative Burdens of Temporary Seizure
The majority opinion in Sanders justified allowing warrantless
searches of automobiles partly on the basis of the greater admin-
istrative burden involved in the seizure of automobiles. The
Court viewed a policy favoring temporary seizure of automobiles
over immediate warrantless search as requiring local law en-
forcement agencies of all sizes to provide personnel and equip-
ment for impounding seized automobiles. The temporary seizure
of the automobiles could thereby impose severe, even impossible,
burdens on police departments. However, because luggage is
more readily stored in a much smaller area, its seizure does not
impose comparable burdens. 136
There is no indication, however, that such difficulties actually
134. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). It should be noted that Justice White was the author of
the majority opinion in Chambers allowing search after the vehicle was completely
under the dominion and control of police; joined in the plurality opinion of Card-
well upholding a warrantless search on the basis of diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in an automobile; and wrote an opinion in Coolidge which stated "searches of
vehicles on probable cause but without a warrant have been deemed reasonable
S.. without requiring proof of exigent circumstances beyond the fact that a mova-
ble vehicle is involved." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 524 (1971)
(White, J., concurring and dissenting). The more favorable attitude towards indi-
vidual rights in automobiles in Prouse may indicate a willingness to give more pro-
tection to individual rights in automobile exception cases in the future.
135. 440 U.S. at 662-63.
136. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n.14 (1979).
existed in the police departments involved in cases where the
Supreme Court approved warrantless searches of automobiles.
Rather, it would appear that the Court has taken the position that
since additional administrative difficulties would be imposed on
some police departments, it will not require any police depart-
ment to detain a vehicle until a search warrant can be obtained
even though "a warrantless search involves the greater sacrifice
of Fourth Amendment values." 37
In determining whether warrantless searches should be al-
lowed, a better approach would be to determine the capabilities of
the individual police department. If a police department does not
have the necessary personnel or facilities to temporarily seize a
vehicle then a true exigency exists and a warrantless "on-the-spot
search" is reasonable if based upon probable cause.l3 8 However,
when there are sufficient police personnel and facilities to tempo-
rarily seize a vehicle, the greater intrusion of warrantless search
should not be permitted. 39
An approach which necessitates an analysis of an individual po-
lice department's capabilities might be criticized as providing dif-
ferent standards for different police departments: one for the
larger, highly organized police department and another for the
smaller, less sophisticated enforcement agency. On closer exami-
nation this is not the case. The standard for all departments
would be temporary seizure of the vehicle until a search warrant
can be obtained. Deviation from this standard would be allowed
only on consent or exigent circumstances. The lack of personnel
or facilities to carry out a temporary seizure creates an exigent
circumstance in which an immediate warrantless search may be
justified. Therefore, any agency, large or small, rural or metropol-
itan, would have to conform to the "lesser intrusion" whenever
possible.140
137. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 63 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-14 (search of
footlocker greater intrusion into fourth amendment values).
138. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 64 n.9 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
139. See id. at 64. A California court of appeal recently determined that a war-
rantless search of a vehicle was invalid by considering the sufficiency of police
personnel and facilities in the particular case. Finding the resources adequate to
seize the car, the court held impoundment to be "[t]he proper and only legitimate
procedure." People v. Rodriguez, 102 Cal. App. 3d 510, 522, 162 Cal. Rptr. 535, 542
(1980), hearing granted, (June 19, 1980). See note 133 supra for the effect of the
granting of a hearing.
140. It is possible, though highly improbable, that an enforcement agency could
by its own actions create the circumstances necessitating warrantless searches.
However, it is absurd to imagine an agency cutting down either on personnel or
facilities in order to accomplish this.
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DISCARDING THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
Both individual rights and law enforcement objectives suffer
from use of the automobile exception. Individuals are subjected
to nonexigent warrantless searches while law enforcement of-
ficers must apply a standard fraught with inconsistencies which
require them to make subjective choices. Officers must decide
whether an individual has a justified expectation of privacy in an
object, how great that expectation is, and whether that object is
an "integral part" of a vehicle. Based on all these factors, officers
must decide whether a warrantless search is permissible or
whether the object must be temporarily seized until a search war-
rant is obtained. It is a determination that in many cases is diffi-
cult for courts to make, 41 yet police officers must make it on the
spot in situations which are often stressful, confused and in many
instances dangerous. The possibility for error is great. Mistakes
are made that both violate individual rights and result in the ex-
clusion of important evidence.142 A clear, consistent standard
calling for the temporary seizure of a vehicle and its contents un-
til a warrant can be secured would protect individual rights and
enhance effective law enforcement.
Inconsistencies in Present Law
There are at least two areas in which police officials must make
a subjective choice in the application of the automobile exception.
The first involves determining which items found in a stopped ve-
hicle are protected from warrantless search under Chadwick and
Sanders and which, given probable cause, may be validly
searched without a warrant under Carroll and Chambers.
If a container, used as a repository for personal effects, is per-
manently attached to a pickup truck, a police officer, given proba-
141. Under the present standard for warrantless automobile searches courts
presented with strikingly similar fact patterns reach contradictory results. See,
e.g., United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (search of closed cardboard
boxes lawfully seized in search of van found to be illegal); State v. Kahlon, 172 N.J.
Super. 331, 411 A.2d 1178 (1980) (search of closed cardboard box found in automo-
bile trunk found not to be illegal); Daigger v. State - Ark. - , 595 S.W.2d 653
(1980) (woman's purse located between front seats of vehicle not protected from
warrantless search; distinguished from Sanders by location of purse in passenger
compartment rather than trunk); Bradford v. State - Ind. App. -, 401 N.E.2d 77
(1980) (purse taken from passenger compartment of vehicle protected from war-
rantless search).
142. See generally cases cited notes 92 & 141 supra.
ble cause, would probably be able to conduct a warrantless search
of the container as an integral part of a mobile vehicle under Car-
roll and Chambers. Yet if the container is not attached to the
truck, the officer may not be able to conduct a search without a
warrant under Chadwick and Sanders. The individual's privacy
expectations in the two objects, identical save for the fact that
one is attached to the truck while the other is not, would seem to
be similar if not the same. Yet only one would appear to be pro-
tected by the warrant clause. The significant difference must lie
in the fact that the police officer can easily remove one container
to a storage room but seizing the other would require impounding
the vehicle.143 Assuming that this is a valid distinction, there re-
mains the question of how much effort is required of the police
officer to remove the container. If the container, instead of being
permanently attached to the truck, is temporarily attached in a
manner that allows removal, the cases give no guidance whether
the police officer should remove it and secure a warrant or search
it as an "integral" part of the vehicle. In fact, the degree of effort
necessary to remove the container may itself be another factor a
police officer must consider in determining whether a warrantless
search is allowed.
In addition to having to decide whether a particular item is an
integral part of the vehicle, the police officer must also decide,
even for unattached items, whether there is a sufficient expecta-
tion of privacy in the item for it to fall under the protection of
Chadwick and Sanders. Personal luggage is clearly covered, but
it is not clear whether paper bags, cardboard boxes or other con-
tainers are protected.144 In each instance the police officer has to
make a subjective determination of the expectation of privacy in a
particular item.
In considering expectations of privacy the police officer is con-
fronted with another problem. Some "integral parts" of an auto-
mobile may also enjoy a great expectation of privacy. As pointed
out by Mr. Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Sanders, there is
probably very little difference between the expectation of privacy
in a locked glove compartment and the expectation of privacy in a
piece of luggage found in the car.145 People may carry personal
papers in the glove compartment, in the console or even in the
shelves provided in some cars under the dash. These areas would
seem to be analogous to personal luggage since they act as reposi-
tories for personal effects. The expectation of privacy in these ar-
143. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66 n.14 (1979).
144. See generally cases cited note 141 supra.
145. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 769 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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eas, especially if they are closed, would seem to be similar to that
enjoyed in luggage, rather than to that enjoyed in the open, more
visible areas of the vehicle.146 Yet, a temporary seizure of these
areas requires the impoundment of the entire vehicle with all of
the burdens involved. The police officer is confronted with the
question of whether the courts will uphold a warrantless search
under the automobile exception because of the administrative
burdens involved in temporarily seizing the vehicle or find the
search unreasonable because it violated a justified privacy expec-
tation.
In addition to making a determination whether certain items
within a vehicle may be searched without a warrant, the police of-
ficer must also make a second subjective determination-whether
the vehicle itself is subject to search without a warrant. Many ve-
hicles in the United States are not used exclusively or even pri-
marily for transportation. The house trailer, the self-contained
camper, the camper on the back of a pickup truck, and even the
house boat are all used for homes as well as for transportation. A
police officer must determine whether a particular "vehicular
home" is more closely analogous to a dwelling than to a mode of
transportation. An individual's expectation of privacy in his or
her home is very great. However, when the "home" is mobile, it is
subject to the same containment problems as an automobile. It is
unclear whether a warrantless search would be justified on the
grounds of the "vehicle's" mobility and the burden involved in
temporary seizure or whether a warrant would be required in
light of the individual's justified privacy expectations.
The possibilities for inconsistency, confusion and the resultant
appeals of convictions are infinite under the present approach.147
As stated by Mr. Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in
Sanders, the "heightened possibilities for error will mean that
many convictions will be overturned, highly relevant evidence
again will be excluded and guilty persons will be set free." 48
Moreover, under the present approach, many individuals, whether
they are innocent or guilty, will have their fourth amendment
146. See People v. Rodriguez, 102 Cal. App. 3d 510, 520, 162 Cal. Rptr. 535, 541
(1980), hearing granted, (June 19, 1980) (higher expectation of privacy in vehicle's
trunk than in passenger compartment). See note 133 supra for the effect of the
granting of a hearing.
147. See generally cases cited note 141 supra.
148. 442 U.S. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
rights violated because of the inability of police officers to apply a
standard beset with inconsistencies. It would be better to adopt
the clear-cut rule that, absent truly exigent circumstances, includ-
ing circumstances where law enforcement personnel are unable
to effect a temporary seizure of the vehicle, a warrant is required
to search an automobile or its contents. Under such a standard,
both the fourth amendment protection of individuals' rights and a
clear-cut model for police enforcement could be achieved.
Temporary Seizure of Automobiles
In order to determine whether temporary seizure until a war-
rant can be secured or immediate warrantless search is prefera-
ble in fourth amendment terms, it is necessary to look at the
values being protected by the amendment. By looking at these
values, a determination may be made as to which procedure is
the "greater" or "lesser" violation of the rights intended to be pro-
tected. The Court has determined that warrantless search is the
"greater" intrusion for personal luggage taken from a vehicle149
but the majority of the Court has been equivocal regarding
automobiles.150
In the early automobile exception cases the Court stated that
the value to be protected by the fourth amendment is the right of
an individual to travel free from unreasonable interference.'51 Al-
lowing an immediate warrantless search of a vehicle stopped on
the highway on the sole basis of probable cause is consistent with
protecting this value. A temporary seizure on the road with a
rapid concomitant search interferes far less with freedom of
travel than seizure of the vehicle with removal to the station
house until a search warrant can be secured.
The Court has now shifted its emphasis to the protection of an
individual's privacy interest as the primary purpose of the fourth
149. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
150. Id. at 13-14 n.8 (noting that Chambers Court was unwilling to determine
whether immediate warrantless search of temporary seizure until a warrant is se-
cured was the greater intrusion). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970):
[A]rguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only
the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant
is obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the
magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which
the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question .... For constitutional
purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and hold-
ing a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and
on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.
Id. at 51-52.
151. See note 78 supra.
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amendment.152 A seizure interferes primarily with an individual's
possessory interest in an item. A search interferes not only with
a possessory interest during the time necessary to accomplish the
search, but with a privacy interest in its contents. As the Court
recognized in Chadwick, an individual's principal privacy interest
is not in a container which is exposed to view but in its contents.
Therefore, a search of the interior is a far greater intrusion than
seizure and detention of the container. 5 3 This is also true of
automobiles.
The primary intrusion involved in the temporary seizure of an
automobile is the denial of its use and possession. 54 Although
this may involve a substantial infringement of an individual's
rights, these rights have not been singled out for particular fourth
amendment protection as has privacy. Moreover, if an individual
feels that he will suffer a greater deprivation of his rights by tem-
porary seizure, he is free to consent to an immediate search, thus
avoiding the need for the temporary detention. 5 5 Absent the in-
dividual's own determination that a search would be less violative
of his rights, the C6urt's current emphasis on privacy mandates
that warrantless search is the greater violation of an individual's
fourth amendment protections. Therefore, in the absence of con-
sent or truly exigent circumstances, a vehicle should be tempora-
rily seized until a warrant for the "greater intrusion" of search
can be obtained.
Temporary seizure of the vehicle until a search warrant can be
secured would involve difficulties. These would include adminis-
trative problems, particularly for the smaller law enforcement
agencies. Although this burden could be greatly reduced by tak-
ing the resources of the agency into account in determining
whether exigent circumstances exist, it would be unrealistic to as-
sume there would not be an added burden on the police depart-
ments.
Even in the most highly organized department there would be
additional administrative burdens involved in impounding more
automobiles. The seeking of additional warrants would create
more paper work and administrative demands. But the right of
152. See generally cases cited note 23 supra.
153. 433 U.S. at 13-14 n.8.
154. Id.
155. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 64 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
individuals to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures
must be balanced against these administrative difficulties.
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more effi-
cient can never by itself justify disregard for the Fourth Amendment. The
investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnec-
essary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote
the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may
not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforce-
ment of the criminal law.156
The warrant clause should function to protect citizens from the
"over-zealous" law enforcement official. 57 This protection should
not be eliminated solely because administrative burdens will be
increased.
The administrative difficulties involved in temporary seizure
would in some measure be offset for law enforcement personnel
by added consistency. Rather than having to deal with the ambi-
guities inherent in the present approach, the police officer would
be provided with a clear-cut standard. Although possibly more
demanding initially, temporary seizure in all but truly exigent cir-
cumstances would be more consistent and leave less room for er-
ror. This could result in fewer appeals and more stable
convictions.
Limiting warrantless searches that are currently allowed under
the automobile exception would in no way affect warrantless
searches of automobiles allowed by other established exceptions.
A police officer would still be able to search the vehicle to the ex-
tent allowed by a search incident to arrest, "stop and frisk" an oc-
cupant of the automobile believed to be carrying a weapon,
search where evidence is threatened with loss or destruction, and
seize evidence that is in plain view.15 8 The availability of other
exceptions would mitigate the impact of limiting the automobile
exception because enforcement personnel would in many cases
still be able to conduct a warrantless search whenever the exi-
gency behind one of the other exceptions is present.159
156. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
157. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
158. See notes 5 & 7-10 supra, for a listing and explanation of other exceptions
to the warrant requirement. In order to apply the plain view doctrine there must
be an inadvertent discovery of evidence by an individual who is legally entitled to
be where the discovery is made. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (initial
intrusion justified by concern for safety of general public); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971) (search under plain view doctrine not justified because of
lack of inadvertence); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (initial intrusion
justified to safeguard owner's property).
159. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Chadwick, felt it was likely that another
exception would be available for the warrantless search of luggage in "most" in-
stances. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
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Some of the burdens involved in temporary seizure may be alle-
viated by the availability of telephonic search warrants. This
practice is currently allowed under the federal rules and in a lim-
ited number of states. 160 If more states were to adopt this prac-
tice, the administrative difficulties and delay involved in
procuring a warrant for the search of an automobile would be sig-
nificantly decreased.
CONCLUSION
The automobile exception has been distorted over the years to
such an extent that it is no longer limited by the exigency that ne-
cessitated its adoption. It should be dropped in favor of tempora-
rily seizing a vehicle until a search warrant can be obtained. This
would be consistent with protecting the privacy interests of indi-
viduals.
The original justification for the exception was the mobility of
the vehicle. The Supreme Court no longer requires a threat that
the vehicle will be removed in order to permit a warrantless
search. The Court has developed two additional justifications for
not requiring warrants for the search and seizure of an automo-
bile. The validity of the first of these, a generalized diminished
expectation of privacy in an automobile, is questionable. Because
an individual uses his car for transportation and is subject to reg-
ulation in its operation, he does not necessarily lose his expecta-
tion of privacy in other aspects of his car. The second justification
is that temporary seizure of the vehicle would impose a severe
burden on law enforcement agencies. However, a policy of tempo-
rary seizure need not necessarily impose an unmanageable bur-
den on the police. Warrantless searches should be allowed
whenever it is difficult or impossible for police to secure a war-
rant. If there are insufficient staff or facilities to keep the sus-
pects in custody, protect the vehicle, and secure a warrant, a true
exigency exists and a warrantless search would be justified.
Despite administrative difficulties which may arise, temporary
seizure is preferable to the present practice. The automobile ex-
ception contains inconsistencies which result in the exclusion of
evidence and the overturning of convictions. A policy requiring
the temporary seizure of an automobile in the absence of true ex-
160. See Note, United States v. Turner: Dial-A-Warrant, 1978 DET. CL. REV. 307
for a review of jurisdictions using telephonic search warrants.
igency would provide a clear standard for law enforcement per-
sonnel.
Even more importantly, such a standard would assure that per-
sons are not stripped of their fourth amendment rights when they
step into an automobile. People should and do have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an automobile. If there is no true exi-
gency, they should be entitled to the same fourth amendment
protection in an automobile as they are entitled to in other consti-
tutionally protected areas.
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